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Abstract
Deep neural networks (DNNs) have been widely applied in various applications
involving image, text, audio, and graph data. However, recent studies have shown
that DNNs are vulnerable to adversarial attack. Though there are several works
studying adversarial attack and defense on domains such as images and text pro-
cessing, it is difficult to directly transfer the learned knowledge to graph data due
to its representation challenge. Given the importance of graph analysis, increasing
number of works start to analyze the robustness of machine learning models on
graph. Nevertheless, current studies considering adversarial behaviors on graph
data usually focus on specific types of attacks with certain assumptions. In ad-
dition, each work proposes its own mathematical formulation which makes the
comparison among different methods difficult. Therefore, in this paper, we aim to
survey existing adversarial attack strategies on graph data and provide an unified
problem formulation which can cover all current adversarial learning studies on
graph. We also compare different attacks on graph data and discuss their corre-
sponding contributions and limitations. Finally, we discuss several future research
directions in this area.
1 Introduction
Recent years have witnessed several success brought by deep neural networks (DNNs) in various
domains. Such high expressive models outperform other models in fields, including image recogni-
tion [17], natural language processing [12], as well as the advanced applications such as healthcare
analysis [23], brain circuits analysis [20], and functionality of mutations in DNA [32].
Given the outstanding performance, deep learning has been applied in some safety and security
critical tasks such as self driving [4], malware detection [27], identification [28] and anomaly de-
tection [14]. However, the lack of interpretability and robustness of deep neural networks makes
them vulnerable to adversarial attack. Szegedy et al. [30] pointed out the susceptibility of deep
neural networks in image classification. The performance of a well-trained deep neural network
can be significantly degraded by adversarial examples, which are carefully crafted inputs with small
magnitude of perturbation added. Goodfellow et al. [16] analyzed this phenomenon and proposed a
gradient-based method (FGSM) to generate adversarial image samples. Different adversarial attack
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strategies are then proposed to demonstrate the vulnerabilities of DNNs in various settings [3, 8, 31].
For instance, black-box adversarial attack are later explored based on either transferability [21, 24]
or query feedback from the DNN model [2, 6]. Several defense and detection methods have also fol-
lowed up to mitigate such adversarial behaviors [22, 26], while various adaptive attacks are proposed
showing that detection/defense is hard in general [1, 7].
Study Task Graph Type Attack Category Attacker Knowledge Attack Strategy Perturbation Evaluation
Dai et al. [11]
Graph classification
Node classification
Dynamic
Static Evasion
Gradient information
Return labels Add/Delete edges Equivalency indicator
Zugner et al. [33] Node classification
Dynamic
Attributed
Evasion
Poisoning Train/Test Data; Model parameters
Add/Delete edges
Change node features
Degree distribution
Feature co-occurrence
Chen et al. [9] Link prediction Dynamic Poisoning Gradient information Add/Delete edges #edge
Chen and Sun et al.[10, 29] Node embedding Dynamic Poisoning Gradient information Add/Delete edges #edge
ICLR19-1 Node embedding Dynamic Poisoning
Train/Test Data; Model parameters
Gradient information Add/Delete edges #edge
ICLR19-2 Node classification Dynamic Poisoning Train/Test Data Add/Delete edges Degree distribution
ICLR19-3 Node classification Dynamic Evasion Train/Test Data Add fake nodes Discriminator
Table 1: Summary of existing work on adversarial attack on graph data
Although there are increasing number of studies on adversarial attack and defense, such adversarial
analysis mainly focuses on image, natural language, and speech domains. Related studies on graph
data are just at the beginning despite the importance of graph data in many real-world applications.
For example, in the credit prediction application, an adversary can easily disguise himself by adding
friendship connection with others, which may cause severe consequences [11]. Compared with pre-
vious adversarial analysis in non-graph data, the study on graph data raises several new challenges:
1) Unlike images consisting of continuous features, the graph structure and the nodes’ features are
discrete. It is difficult to design efficient algorithms that are able to generate adversarial examples
in the discrete domain. 2) Adversarial perturbations are designed to be imperceptible to human in
image domain, so one can force certain distance function, such as Lp norm distance to be small
between adversarial and benign instances. While in graph, how to define “imperceptible" or “subtle
perturbation" requires further analysis, measurement and study.
Given the importance of graph-related applications and the successful applicability of graph neural
networks (GNNs), both academia and industry are interested in the robustness of GNNs. In recent
several months, some researchers begin to focus on adversarial attack for a set of GNN models. In
this paper, we contribute the first study on summarizing different attacks on graph data and provid-
ing taxonomies for them according to various criteria. We briefly summarize current adversarial
attacks in Table 1. Basically, first according to time-changing perspective and node/edge features,
we categorize graph types into static or dynamic/attributed or non-attributed graph. We consider
different learning tasks on graph, including node classification, graph classification, link prediction
and node embedding. Based on the goal of the attacker, such as whether he/her aims to fool the
training or testing process, we draw the attack category as evasion attack or poisoning attack. We
also characterize the attacks based on the knowledge required for performing attacks, e.g. train-
ing/testing data information, model parameter and gradient. In addition, adversary can take several
attack strategies in different studies. Most works perform the attack by changing structural infor-
mation, e.g. adding/deleting edge, while Zugner et al.[33] modify the features of nodes as well.
Finally, in order to demonstrate imperceptible modification for human, each paper proposes its per-
turbation evaluation strategies, includingmodification budgets on edge, node degree distribution and
discriminators.
There are couple of works focusing on evasion attacks. Dai et al. [11] allow strategies as
adding/deleting edge. Zugner et al. [33] adopt the similar strategy but argue that node degree
distribution should be preserved to avoid detection. Similarly aiming to achieve poisoning attack,
Chen et al. [9, 10] apply adding/deleting edge strategies. ICLR-2 requires the similar node degree
distribution after modification. Compared with other works, Dai et al. [11] are the only group which
designs the black-box attack. In this case, the attacker is asked to create adversarial modifications
of new samples by doing black-box queries on some of the samples. Table 1 summarizes the main
characteristics of the existing papers.
In summary, this survey makes the following contributions:
• We perform the first throughout study to summarize currently released studies about adver-
sarial attack on graph data with the discussion about their contributions and limitations.
• We give an unified problem formulation to illustrate the common leaning tasks on graph
and the corresponding adversarial attack.
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• Given diverse definitions of current perturbation measurement metrics, we make several
principles for choosing perturbation metrics in different scenarios.
• We point out the potential research opportunities and directions in the future study.
The rest of this survey is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the necessary background infor-
mation of graph and its relevant applications. Section 3 provides the unified problem formulation
and discusses the existing adversarial attack studies on graph data. Section 4 summaries the con-
tributions and limitations of excising work and discusses the potential research opportunities in the
future. The last section concludes this survey.
2 Graph
In this section, we first give the notations of graph data, and then introduce the preliminaries about
the graph types, the learning settings, and the application tasks on graph data.
2.1 Notations
We use G = {Gi}Ni=1 to represent a set of graphs, whereN is the number of graphs. Each graphGi
is generally denoted by a set of nodes Vi = {v
(i)
j } and edgesEi = {e
(i)
j }, where e
(i)
j = (v
(i)
j,1, v
(i)
j,2) ∈
Vi × Vi is the edge between the nodes v
(i)
j,1 and v
(i)
j,2. Optionally, the nodes and the edges can have
other features such as node features, edge weights, and edge direction. According to these features,
graph data can be classified into different types.
2.2 Type of Graph Data
From a time-changing perspective, graphs can be grouped into static graphs and dynamic graphs.
Definition 2.1. (Static Graph). A static graph, denoted as G(S), consists of a fixed set of nodes and
edges that does not change over time.
Definition 2.2. (Dynamic Graph). A graph is a dynamic graph, denoted as G(Dy), if any of its
nodes, edges, node features, or edges features changes over time.
A typical example of static graph is the molecular structure of drugs [13]. Once a drug is developed,
its molecular structure does not change overtime. We can convert the molecular structure to a static
graph. Social network [25] is a good example of dynamic graphs. As people often add or remove
friendship to their social network, the graph extracted from the social network changes over time. In
most existing attack works, the researchers study the attack on one dynamic graph.
In addition adding or deleting edge, the attacker also can change the features on the graph. Based
on the edge features, we can classify graphs into attributed/unattributed graphs on edge or node.
Definition 2.3. (Attributed Graph on edge). An attributed graph on edge, denoted as G(Ae), having
some features associated with each edge, which is denoted by x(e(i)j ) ∈ R
Dedge .
The weighted graph where each edge has a weight, x(e(i)j ) ∈ R, is a special case of attributed graph
on edges. A traffic flow graph [19] is a typical example of weighted graph where roads are modeled
as edges and road conditions are represented by weights of edges.
The directed graph is a special case of attributed graph on edge, which exists in different applications
widely. In this case, we can change the direction of edges in attacks.
Definition 2.4. (Directed Graph). An directed graph, denoted as G(Dr), having a directed informa-
tion associated with each edge, where any directed edge e(i)1 = (v
(i)
1 , v
(i)
2 ) 6= (v
(i)
2 , v
(i)
1 ) = e
(i)
2 .
Twitter, an online social network, is one typical example, where the directed edge represents the
following information between two people. If there is a directed edge connecting from person A to
person B, it means that person A follows person B. The graphs extracted from these online social
networks are directed graphs.
Considering the node features, graphs can be grouped into attributed/unattributed graphs on nodes.
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Definition 2.5. (Attributed Graph on node). A attributed graph on node, denoted as G(An), having
some features associated with each node, which is denoted by x(v(i)j ) ∈ R
Dnode .
The e-commerce network [15] with different users can be regarded as an example of attributed graph
on node where each user are modeled as nodes with some features.
Other potential attack on diverse types of graph Most existing works study the adversarial
attack on dynamic and non-attributed graph. However, many other types of graph are not completed
studied yet. For example, unlike homogeneous information graph, many complex relations would
be represented as a heterogeneous information graph, and the attacker can choose to change the
type of edge or node. Comparing to add or delete an edge on graph in most existing works, slightly
modifying the node/edge features can be harder to detect by the defender, e.g. weight modification
and altering direction. In addition, static graph has been not well studied yet, but it is frequently
used in reality. In summary, the adversarial attack on graph data can modify more information in
various settings, which brings more research opportunities.
2.3 Learning Settings on Graph Data
This section introduces the different machine learning settings used on graph data. Before intro-
ducing the learning settings, let’s provide the notations for mathematical formulation first. We as-
sociate the target component ci within a graph Gci ∈ G with a corresponding ground truth label
yi ∈ Y = {1, 2, . . . , Y }. Here i ∈ [1,M ], M represents the number of the total target compo-
nents, and Y is the number of classes being predicted. The dataset D(ind) = {(ci, Gci , yi)}Mi=1 is
represented by the target graph component, graph containing ci, and the corresponding ground truth
label of ci. For instance, in a node classification task, ci represents the node to be classified, and yi
denotes its label within Gci . Based on the features of training and testing processes, the learning
settings can be classified as inductive and transductive learning.
Inductive Learning is the most common traditional machine learning setting where the model is
trained by labeled examples, and then predicts the labels of examples never seen during training.
Under the supervised inductive learning setting, the classifier f (ind) ∈ F (ind) : G → Y is optimized:
L(ind) =
1
M
M∑
i=1
L(f
(ind)
θ (ci, G
ci), yi)
where L(·, ·) is the cross entropy by default, and ci can be node, link or graph of its associated graph
Gci . Note that, two or more different instances, c1, c2, . . . , cn can be associated the same graph
G ∈ G.
Transductive Learning Different from inductive learning, the testing graphs have been seen dur-
ing training in the transductive learning.
In this case, the classifier f (tra) ∈ F (tra) : G → Y is optimized:
L(tra) =
1
M
M∑
i=1
L(f
(tra)
θ (ci, G
ci), yi)
In short, transductive learning predicts the label of seen instances, but inductive learning predicts the
label of unseen instances.
Unified Formulation of Learning on Graph Data We give an uniform formula to represent both
supervised inductive and transductive learning as below:
L(·) =
1
M
M∑
i=1
L(f
(·)
θ (ci, G
ci), yi) (1)
where f (·)θ = f
(ind)
θ is inductive learning and f
(·) = f
(tra)
θ is transductive learning.
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In the unsupervised learning setting, we can use the unlabelled dataset D(ind) = {(ci, Gj)}Mi=1 and
replace the unsupervised loss L and function f(ci, Gi) of the Equation 1.
In this survey, we mainly focus on the supervised learning setting. It should be noted that the
supervised learning can be easily transferred to unsupervised learning setting as what we do above.
2.4 Application
In this section, we will introduce the main tasks on graph data, including node-level application,
graph-level application and link-level application.
Node-Level Application The node-level application is the most popular one in both academia and
industry. A classic example is labelling the nodes in webs and social network graphs, which may
contain millions of nodes, such as Facebook and Twitter.
Most existing papers [5, 11, 33] focus on the node-level applications. All of these papers study
node classification in the transductive learning setting whose objective function can be formulated
by modifying Eq.1:
L(tra) =
1
M
M∑
i=1
L(f
(tra)
θ (ci, G
ci), yi) (2)
where f (·)θ = f
(tra)
θ , ci currently is the representation of node target and its associated graph G
ci is
set as a single graphG.
Few existing works have discussed the node-level applications in the inductive leaning setting. How-
ever, these applications frequently appear in the real life. For example, the first party only has several
large and public network information, such as Facebook and Twitter. The second party has private
unlabeled graph data in which the nodes can be predicted by using the information from the first
party. In this case, the node-level classification task is no longer transductive learning, but inductive
learning. It can be easily formulated by modifying Eq.1:
L(ind) =
1
M
M∑
i=1
L(f
(ind)
θ (ci, G
ci), yi) (3)
where f (·)θ = f
(ind)
θ and ci currently is the representation of node target.
Link-Level Application Link prediction on dynamic graphs is one of the most common link-
level applications. The link prediction tries to predict missing links in current networks, and new or
dissolution links in future networks. The corresponding attacks have been discussed in [9].
Compared with node classification tasks, link predication tasks still use node features, but target at
the missing or unlabelled links in the graph. Therefore, we can formulate the link predication task
by slightly changing the Eq.2 and 3, where ci is the representation of link target, and yi ∈ {0, 1}.
Graph-Level Application Graph-level applications are frequently used in the chemistry or med-
ical area, such as drug molecule graphs and brain graphs. In [11], the whole graph is used as the
sample instance. Different from this setting, some other graph-level applications use the sub-graphs
information of a large graph for several special tasks.
Compared with the existing works on node classification and link predication, graph classification
use the graph-structure representation as the features to classify the unlabelled graph instances.
Therefore, we can formulate the graph classification task by slightly changing the Eq.2 and 3, by
setting ci as the representation of graph target.
Other potential attacks on different tasks under diverse settings Several works study the adver-
sarial attack on node classification under transductive learning. Chen et al. [9] study link predication
tasks with same setting. Different from other works, Dai et al. [11] study the attack on classification
tasks under the inductive learning. Many different settings of various graph applications have not
been discussed and studied. For example, we can study the node classification/link prediction tasks
under inductive learning, and graph classification under transductive learning.
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3 Adversarial Attacks on Graph Data
In this section, we will give a general definition of the adversarial attack on graph data, and then
introduce the imperceptibility metrics, attack types, attack tasks and levels of attack knowledge.
Definition 3.1. (General Adversarial Attack on Graph Data) Given a dataset D = (ci, Gi, yi), after
slightly modifying the Gi denoted as Ĝci , the adversarial samples Ĝci and Gi should be similar
under the imperceptibility metrics, but the performance of graph task becomes much worse than
before.
Next, we will talk about an unified problem formulation for general adversarial attack on graph data.
3.1 An Unified Formulation
Existing papers [5, 9, 11, 29, 33] current studies considering adversarial behaviors on graph data
usually focus on specific types of attacks with certain assumptions. In addition, each work proposes
its own mathematical formulation which makes the comparison among different methods difficult.
In order to help candidate understand the relations between different problems earlier, we propose
provide an unified problem formulation which can cover all current existing work.
Definition 3.2. (Adversarial Attack on Graph Data: A Unified Formulation) f can be any learning
task function on graph data, e.g. link prediction, node-level embedding, node-level classification,
graph-level embedding and graph-level classification. Φ(Gi) denote the space of perturbation on
the original graph Gi, and dataset D̂ = {(ci, Ĝci , yi)}Ni=1 denote the attacked instances. The attack
can be depicted as,
max
Ĝci∈Φ(Gi)
∑
i
L(f
(·)
θ∗ (ci, Ĝ
ci), yi))
s.t. θ∗ = argmin
θ
∑
j
L(f
(·)
θ (cj , G
′
j), yj)).
(4)
When G′j equals to Ĝ
cj , Equation 4 represents the poisoning attack; while when G′j is the original
G without modification, Equation 4 denotes the evasion attack. f (·)θ = f
(ind)
θ represents inductive
learning and f (·)θ = f
(tra)
θ transductive learning.
Note that, while Ĝci ∈ Φ(G), (ci, Ĝci) can represent node manipulation, edge manipulation, or
both. For any Ĝci ∈ φ(Gi), Ĝci is required to be similar or close to the original graphGj , and such
similarity measurement can be defined by the general distance function below:
Q(Ĝci , Gi) < ǫ
s.t. Ĝci ∈ φ(Gi)
(5)
whereQ(·, ·) represents the distance function, and ǫ is a parameter denoting the distance/cost budget
for each sample.
Discussion: Graph Distance Function Graph distance functions can be defined in many ways,
a lot of which have been discussed on graph privacy-preserving related work [18]. Such distance
functions include the number of common neighbours of given nodes, cosine similarity, Jaccard sim-
ilarity and so on. However, few of them are discussed in depth regarding to adversarial behaviors
(adversarial cost in game theory). In general, an attacker aims to make “minimal" perturbation on
the existing graph and therefore such distance measurement is important to measure the quality of
attacks. How to design and choose proper distance function to quantify the attack ability under dif-
ferent attack scenarios is also critical towards developing defensive approaches regarding to specific
threat model. We will discuss potential perturbation evaluation metrics in details in Sec 3.2.
In addition to unique properties of each graph distance function, it would also be interesting to
analyze the “equivalence" among them. For instance, an attacker aiming to attack one node by
adding/removing one edge in the graph can encounter similar “adversarial cost" as adding/removing
edges. It is not hard to see that by using a graph distance function, only few targets would be
6
the optimal choices for the attacker (with different distance), so this can also help to optimize the
adversarial targets. In summary, due to the complexity and diversity of graph representation and ad-
versarial behaviors, perturbation evaluation or graph similarity measurement will depend on various
factors such as different learning tasks, adversarial strategies, and adversarial cost types.
3.2 Evaluation Metric for Perturbation on Graph
To generate adversarial samples on graph data, we can modified the nodes or edges from the orig-
inal graph. However, the modified graph Ĝ need to be “similar” with the original graph G based
on certain perturbation evaluation metrics and remain “imperceptible". The following metrics are
discussed to help understand how to define “imperceptible perturbation".
Graph-level Perturbation In most current papers, the attacker is capable of adding/removing
(flipping) edges in the whole original graph within a given budget. In this case, the number of
modified edges is usually used to evaluate the magnitude of perturbation.
Node-level Perturbation The attacker is also capable of adding/removing nodes, or manipulating
the features of target nodes. The evaluationmetric in this case can be calculated based on the number
of nodes modified or the distance between the benign and adversarial feature vectors.
Structure Preserving Perturbation Similar to graph-level perturbation, an attacker can modify
edges in the graph within a given budget in terms of graph structure. For instance, in [33], the
attacker is required to preserve the key structural features of a graph such as the degree distribution.
Therefore, the perturbation here can be measured by the graph structure drift.
Attribute Preserving Perturbation In the attributed graphs, each node or edge has its own fea-
tures. In addition to manipulating the graph structure, the attacker can choose to modify the features
of nodes or edges to generate adversarial samples on graph data. Various measurements based on
graph-attribute properties can be analyzed to characterize the perturbation magnitude. For instance,
in [33], the authors argue adding a feature is imperceptible if a probabilistic random walker on the
co-occurrence graph can reach it with high probability by starting from existing features.
Principles of imperceptible perturbation evaluation Given various graph distance discussion,
there is no clear discussion in existing research about how to set the adversarial cost for attacks on
graph data so far. Therefore, we summarize some principles of defining the perturbation evaluation
metrics as below for future research.
• For static graph, both the number of modified edges and the distance between the benign
and adversarial feature vectors should be small.
• For dynamic graph, we can set the distance or adversarial cost based on the intrinsic chang-
ing information over time. For example, by using statistic analysis, we can get the upper
bound of the information manipulated in practice, and use this information to set an imper-
ceptible bound.
• For various learning tasks on graph data, e.g. node or graph classification, we need to use
an suitable graph distance function to calculate the similarity between the benign and its
adversarial sample. For example, we can use the number of common neighbours to evaluate
the similarity of two nodes, but not applicable for two individual graphs.
Other potential perturbation evaluationmetrics Many potential perturbation evaluationmetrics
can be further studied. For example, by using homomorphism graph generation, we can generate
new adversarial samples on graph data by preserving structure properties, which would be hard to
be detected in practice. Such new graph distance measurements would shed light on new types of
attacks on graph and also provide fruitful directions for further defense studies.
3.3 Attack Type
In this section, we introduce two basic adversarial attack scenarios: evasion and poisoning attacks.
Evasion attack means that the parameters of the trained model are assumed to be fixed. The attacker
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tries to generate the adversarial samples of the trained model. Poisoning attack tries to affect the
performance of the model by adding adversarial samples into the training dataset.
Poisoning Attack Most existing works are poisoning attacks, since their node classification tasks
are performed in transductive learning setting. In this case, once the attacker changes the data, the
model is retrained. Mathematically, by setting G′j = Ĝ
cj in Eq.4, we have a general formula for
adversarial attack on graph data under poisoning attacks.
Evasion Attack Dai at el. [11] designed evasion attacks under inductive learning setting on graph
classification task. ICLR19-3 studied the evasion attack with transductive-learning node classifica-
tion task. Evasion attack only changes the testing data, which is not required to retrain the model.
Mathematically, by setting G′j to original Gj in the Eq.4, we have a general formula for adversarial
attack on graph data under evasion attacks.
3.4 Attacking Graph Learning Task
Corresponding to various tasks on graph data, we show how to attack each task and explain the
general idea with modified uniformed formulations.
Node-relevant Task As mentioned before, most attack papers focus on node-level task, including
node classification [11, 33] and node embedding [5]. Themain difference is that the node embedding
uses the low dimensional representations of each node for adversarial attack. Mathematically, by
setting ci as representation of node target in Eq.4, we have a general formula for adversarial attack
on node-relevant tasks.
Link-relevant Task Other several existing works [5, 9, 29] study the node embedding and used
the node embedding information for link prediction. Compared with node-level classification, the
link predication requires to use the different input data, that ci representation of link target, i.e. the
information of a pair of nodes. By setting ci as representation of link target and yi ∈ [0, 1] in Eq.4,
we have a general formula for adversarial attack on link-relevant tasks.
Graph-relevant Task Only one existing paper studies graph classification [11]. Compared with
node classification, graph classification need the graph representation instead of the node representa-
tion. By setting ci as representation of graph target in Eq.4, we have a general formula for adversarial
attack on graph-relevant tasks.
3.5 Attack Knowledge
The attacker would receive different information to attack the system. Based on this, we can charac-
terize the dangerous levels of existing attacks.
While-box Attack In this case, an attacker can get every information and use them to attack the
system, such as the prediction result, gradient information, etc.. The effective or efficient attack may
not work if the attacker does not break the system first.
Grey-box Attack An attacker gets limited information to attack the system. Comparing to while-
box attack, it is more dangerous to the system, since the attacker only need partial information.
Black-box Attack Under this setting,an attacker can only do black-box queries on some of the
samples. Thus, the attacker generally can not do poisoning attack on the trained model. However, if
black-box attack can work, it would be the most dangerous attack comparing the other two, because
the attacker can attack the model with limited acknowledge.
Most existing papers only studies the white-box attack on graph, and there are lots of opportunities
to study other attacks with different level of knowledge.
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3.6 Attack Goal
Generally, an attacker wants to destroy the performance of the whole system, but sometimes they
prefer to attack few important target instances in the system. Based on the goal of attack, we have:
Availability Attack The adversarial goal of availability attack is to reduce the total performance
of the system. For example, by given a modification budget, we want the performance of the system
decreasing the most as the optimal attack strategy.
Integrity Attack The adversarial goal of integrity attack is to reduce the performance of target
instances. For example, in the recommendation system, we want the model can not successfully
predict the hidden relation between two target people. However, the total performance of the system
are same or similar to the original system.
4 Summaries: Attack on graph
In this section, we compare eight existing relevant papers in Table 4. Then, we talk about the contri-
butions and limitations of these works. Finally, we will discuss the potential research opportunities
in this area.
Semi-supervised Un-supervised Graph Classification Node Classification Link Prediction Transferable
Dai et al. X X X X
Zugner et al. X X X
Chen et al. X X X
Chen and Sun et al. X X X X
ICLR 19-1 X X X X
ICLR 19-2 X X X
ICLR 19-3 X X
Table 2: Comparisons between existing papers
Contributions We summarize the unique contributions of each works in this part. Dai et al. [11]
use the reinforcement learning approach to discover the adversarial attack, which is the only ap-
proach that support black-box attack comparing to other works. Zugner et al. [33] study adversarial
graph samples with traditional machine learning and deep learning. Meanwhile, they are the first and
only group to discuss the adversarial attack on the attribute graph. Chen et al. and Sun et al. [9, 29]
mainly attack the link predication task with deep graph convolutional embedding model. ICLR 19-1
tries to attack the node embedding which is used for different tasks, such as link predication and
node classification. ICLR 19-2 attacks the node classification by using meta-learning which solve
the bi-level problem underlying training-time attacks. This work shows that by using small graph
perturbations consistently lead to a strong decrease in performance for GCN. ICLR 19-3 proposes
a greedy algorithm to find the edges and use GAN to generate the close feature space to attack the
model. It is one of most efficient way to find the good quality adversarial samples.
Limitations The limitations of most current works are summarized below. Most existing works
didn’t give very clear strategies about the setting of the budget and distance with reasonable explana-
tions in real applications. Different with other adversarial attacks, most modifications on graph are
hardly tell by the human in real life. To solve this problem, we give a more detailed discussion on
perturbation and evaluation metrics in the paper. Meanwhile, about graph imperceptible evaluation
metrics, most papers [5, 9, 11] use one metric for attack, but these adversarial samples could be
found by other existing imperceptible evaluation metrics. In this work, we list all existing evalua-
tion metrics, and recommend future adversarial samples imperceptible with most existing evaluation
metrics. Another main issue is that different problem formulations. To solve this problem, we give
the unified problem formulation for all existing works discussed in this survey.
Future Direction Adversarial attack on graph data is a new and hot area, and many research
opportunities are summarized below: 1) Most graphs are attributed graph on node and edge in the
real life. Currently, very few existing works well studied adversarial attack on attributed graph,
e.g. heterogeneous information graph. 2) Some advanced ideas can be applied for generating the
adversarial samples, e.g. homomorphism graph. 3) Various learning settings are not attacked yet,
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such as inductive learning on node classification task. 4) There is none defense system proposed for
adversarial attack on graph data. 5) The main limitation of existing attacks are not consider various
imperceptibility metrics into their attack model. Concise imperceptibility metrics are necessary
in different tasks. Good and explainable evaluation metric may can discover the more existing
adversarial samples created by current methods. 6) Last but not the least, the distance of high
quality adversarial samples are not well studied in this area.
5 Conclusion
In this work, we cover the most released papers about adversarial attack on graph data as we know.
We analyze the contributions and limitations of the released works. We also provide an unified
problem formulation for all existing attacks on graph data. We summary most existing impercep-
tible perturbations evaluation metrics, and discuss several principles about imperceptibility metric.
Finally, we point out the potential research opportunities and directions in future studies.
Currently, there is not much defense work against adversarial attacks on graph data yet, and we will
keep updating when any of them is released.
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